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After all, S&R did still have a claim even when solvent; the issue is
simply whether the auditors can rely on a procedural defence.
Lord Walker acknowledged that the Law Commission has pro-
visionally recommended a wider, more flexible test for the application
of the illegality defence: The Illegality Defence: A Consultative Report
CP No. 189 (2009). This would undoubtedly be an improvement on the
current law. However, Lord Walker also stated that such proposals
would only be effective “if enacted by Parliament”, at [130]. The Law
Commission suggested that legislative reform in the tortious sphere is
not necessary; but it is to be hoped that the final report will recognise
the need for a statutory discretion. It may also be incumbent upon the
Law Commission to re-examine the issue of whether the illegality de-
fence should provide an absolute bar to a claim. Their Lordships were
not persuaded by the argument that contributory negligence should be
used to adjust the burden of loss between the parties, but Lord Mance
was attracted by the possibility of a more balanced, discretionary de-
fence. It is submitted that the courts should be able to apportion
damages after applying the illegality defence; its current all-or-nothing
nature renders it very much a “blunt instrument”.
Moore Stephens will no doubt come as a great relief to auditors, but
the scope of the decision is very narrow and limited to “one-man”
companies (or arguably situations in which all the directors and
shareholders are complicit in the fraud). It does not universally absolve
auditors of a duty to detect fraud. This would be highly undesirable;
indeed, even the result in Moore Stephens may be considered trouble-
some. “The world has had sufficient experience of Ponzi schemes
operated by individuals owning ‘one man’ companies for it to be
questionable policy to relieve from all responsibility auditors negli-
gently failing in their duty to check and report on such companies’
activities”, per Lord Mance at [206].
PAUL S. DAVIES
NEGLIGENCE, NEIGHBOURLINESS, AND THE WELFARE STATE
WHEN Lord Atkin enunciated the neighbour principle (in Donoghue v.
Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562, 580), he struck a blow for simplicity in
negligence law. For he declared that defendants – all defendants –
could be held liable for carelessly inflicting harm on others while closely
and directly interacting with them. However, Lord Atkin’s colleagues
made it plain nine years later, that they were not prepared to apply this
approach to public bodies (East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v.
Kent [1941] A.C. 74). Since then, judges have worked assiduously to
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limit the circumstances in which claimants can successfully sue public
bodies. Thus claimants have to negotiate a number of barriers to
recovery that do not exist in other areas of negligence law. They include
the requirement that claimants show that a public body has exercised a
statutory discretion “so carelessly or unreasonably” as to have “acted
in abuse or excess of [its] power” (Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co Ltd
[1970] A.C. 1004, 1031, per Lord Reid).
But while negligence doctrine relating to public bodies has devel-
oped along these lines, some judges go about their business in Atkinian
fashion. This is true of Maddison J.’s response to the claim in X and Y
v. Hounslow L.B.C. [2008] EWHC 1168. X and Y were a couple with
learning difficulties who (with their children) occupied a council flat.
The couple (who were vulnerable to exploitation) befriended some
youths and, as a result, saw their home turned, by degrees, into a den of
evil. The youths used the flat as a place where they could take drugs,
have sex, and store stolen goods. The couple’s social worker, on be-
coming aware of these developments, urged the Council to relocate
them. But before the Council had considered what to do, the youths
physically and sexually abused the couple in their home. The couple
sued the Council in negligence. Maddison J., having applied the three-
stage duty of care test in Caparo Industries plc v.Dickman [1990] 2 A.C.
605, concluded that he could incrementally develop the law and impose
la duty of care on the Council. For harm to the couple was reasonably
foreseeable by the time the couple’s social worker became aware of the
youths’ presence in the flat. The relationship between the parties was
also proximate and, on the judge’s analysis, the imposition of a duty of
care was just, fair, and reasonable. He took this view on the ground
that the duty he was imposing was “very narrow” and would not in-
spire “a flood of future claims”. Maddison J. also described the Council
as “a single entity”. This led him to conclude that Council personnel
performing one task may be, and here were, duty-bound to respond to
requests for assistance from those performing other tasks. Moreover
Maddison J. found that the Council had breached its duty of care and
that this breach caused the claimants’ damage.
The Council appealed successfully. Unlike Maddison J., Sir
Anthony Clarke M.R. (with the support of Goldring and Tuckey L.JJ.)
did not simply address the three questions that make up the Caparo
duty test (X and Y v. Hounslow L.B.C. [2009] EWCA Civ 286). Instead
he noted that the claim fell outside existing categories of case in which
judges have imposed negligence liability (e.g. where the person causing
harm is under the supervision of a public body). He also noted that
Maddison J. had not considered whether the Council had assumed
responsibility for the claimants. The Master of the Rolls added that, if
the defendant had owed a duty, the claimants’ social worker would not
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have breached it, contrary to the finding of Maddison J. This was be-
cause she had conducted herself in a way that a responsible body of
fellow professionals would have endorsed. Hence, she satisfied the test
in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 W.L.R.
582, 587. The Master of the Rolls also criticised the judge’s decision to
treat the Council as “a single entity”. On Clarke M.R.’s view,
Maddison J. had failed to grasp that a local authorities’ statutory
powers and duties are “many and various” and that council personnel
typically concentrate on “particular functions”.
The body of negligence doctrine applied by Maddison J. and the
Court of Appeal in X and Y is fraught with tension. Judges are sensitive
to the demands of corrective justice. Thus we find Lord Browne-
Wilkinson declaring that this ideal has the first claim on judicial “loy-
alty: X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 A.C. 633, 633.
But judges are also aware that they may, by imposing liability on public
bodies, deflect them from the pursuit of the public interest. The House
of Lords has recently made this point in Mitchell v. Glasgow City
Council [2009] UKHL 11, [2009] 1 A.C. 874 (when rejecting a claim
against the defendant for failure to protect one of its tenants from a
fatal attack mounted by another tenant).
The tensions on display in X (Minors) andMitchell were at work in
X and Y. The Court of Appeal’s response was to read the relevant
doctrine narrowly and to emphasise the Council’s many responsibilities
to the public. These points suggest that the Court paid scant regard to
corrective justice and based its decision on public interest-related con-
siderations. For the Court might have interpreted doctrine bearing on
the parties’ relationship quite differently. After all, the threat of harm
was readily apparent to the claimants’ social worker. The court might
have concluded that, the close relationship between the couple and the
Council made them neighbours in Lord Atkin’s sense. Hence, the
Court might have incrementally developed existing doctrine by estab-
lishing a new category analogous to existing ones.
But before we berate the Court of Appeal for failing to do this, we
should think hard about the context in which the claimants sued. As
the welfare state has grown, judges have elaborated negligence doctrine
in ways that have reduced the circumstances in which public bodies are
the neighbours of those they serve. This suggests that, as Parliament
has saddled councils with more welfare-related burdens, judges have
identified neighbourliness as a luxury that society cannot afford. These
points provide support for the conclusion that we would be wrong to
see in the welfare state the outlines of New Jerusalem.
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